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The growth of consumer credit in Asia
Consumer credit has shown strong growth in emerging and newly industrialised Asian
economies in recent years.  While credit card lending has helped smooth consumer
spending and improved the profitability of financial institutions, it also represents a new
source of risk.
Preventing financial and macroeconomic instability associated with consumer lending
requires policy makers to be confident that lenders have proper risk management
systems in place and consumers have sustainable debt burdens.  Public policy also
needs to ensure that essential infrastructure for consumer credit is available and set up
properly, such as credit information bureaux and personal debt workout systems.
by Dong He, Effie Yao and Kim-hung Li of the External Department
Corporate and financial sector restructuring in the
aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis has
led to a marked turnaround in the balance sheets of
financial institutions in Asia.  The significance of
household lending has increased sharply.  In
particular, non-secured credit card debt has been
growing exceptionally fast, albeit from a low base.
These developments raise a number of issues, such
as the implications for financial stability due to a rapid
rise in consumer credit, whether risk management
systems and supervisory practices should be
strengthened in response to the new risks involved,
and whether governments need to look at new
requirements in financial sector infrastructure.  This
paper attempts to address these issues.  It focuses
on the growth of non-secured credit card debt
instead of mortgages, which have been dealt with
extensively elsewhere.  It will first provide an overview
of consumer credit in various Asian economies, and
then focus on Hong Kong’s experience and the
lessons learnt.
Recent developments in Asia
Household credit grew strongly in emerging and
newly industrialised Asian economies in the past few
years (Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3).  As banks and
non-bank lenders suffered large losses from their
TABLE 1
Growth of household credit
(year on year)
H1
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China1 206.1205.4 63.9 n.a. 50.0 n.a.
Hong Kong2 2.6 4.4 3.3 -1.4 -3.9 -1.3
Korea3 16.5 24.7 28.0 28.5 1.9 4.3
Malaysia4 5.4 17.2 17.0 16.8 13.9 14.5
Philippines5 -11.7 2.2 -1.9 0.2 -1.1 10.8
Singapore6 5.2 11.0 6.0 2.9 11.4 12.4
Taiwan7 4.3 6.6 -0.3 4.1 13.5 18.4
Thailand8 -7.5 -5.9 1.0 16.2 30.2 29.1
Source:CEIC, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Thailand &
authors’ estimates.
1. Data from People’s Bank of China.
2. Loans of authorized institutions to private and professional
individuals, except those for business purposes.
3. Data from Bank of Korea.
4. Loans of commercial banks, merchant banks and finance
companies for residential properties, personal uses and
purchases of consumer durables and cars.
5. Loans of commercial banks to individuals.
6. Commercial banks’ housing loans and loans to professional
and private individuals, and finance companies’ housing loans
and hire purchase loans for cars and consumer durables.
7. Consumer loans of commercial banks.
8. Personal consumption loans of commercial banks and finance
companies and housing loans of government housing bank,
government savings banks and credit foncier companies.FEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
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TABLE 2
Total household credit as a percentage of GDP
H1
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China1 1.7 4.8 7.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong2 58.3 58.9 61.7 62.0 60.9 58.9
Korea3 40.4 46.154.9 64.2 62.0 61 .0
Malaysia4 37.5 38.5 46.3 50.0 52.2 52.4
Philippines5 7.16.4 5.7 5.3 4.9 5.4
Singapore6 45.9 44.6 48.9 49.154.3 54.1
Taiwan7 41.6 42.6 43.2 43.8 49.2 52.5
Thailand8 19.6 17.4 16.8 18.4 22.0 22.6
Source:CEIC, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Thailand &
authors’ estimates.
1. Data from People’s Bank of China.
2. Loans of authorized institutions to private and professional
individuals, except those for business purposes.
3. Data from Bank of Korea.
4. Loans of commercial banks, merchant banks and finance
companies for residential properties, personal uses and
purchases of consumer durables and cars.
5. Loans of commercial banks to individuals.
6. Commercial banks’ housing loans and loans to professional
and private individuals, and finance companies’ housing loans
and hire purchase loans for cars and consumer durables.
7. Consumer loans of commercial banks.
8. Personal consumption loans of commercial banks and finance
companies and housing loans of government housing bank,
government savings banks and credit foncier companies.
TABLE 3
Total household credit as a percentage of total loans
H1
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China1 1.5 4.3 6.2 8.0 10.0 n.a.
Hong Kong2 25.8 30.8 35.9 37.2 36.5 35.6
Korea3 42.7 46.7 55.158.0 56.3 56.2
Malaysia4 28.6 31.8 35.8 40.0 43.4 44.5
Philippines5 15.5 14.8 15.0 14.7 14.0 16.4
Singapore6 39.4 41 .9 43.145.148.5 50.3
Taiwan7 34.2 34.3 34.7 36.9 39.8 41.6
Thailand8 16.0 16.7 17.7 19.0 23.4 24.4
Source:CEIC, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Thailand &
authors’ estimates.
1. Data from People’s Bank of China.
2. Loans of authorized institutions to private and professional
individuals, except those for business purposes.
3. Data from Bank of Korea.
4. Loans of commercial banks, merchant banks and finance
companies for residential properties, personal uses and
purchases of consumer durables and cars.
5. Loans of commercial banks to individuals.
6. Commercial banks’ housing loans and loans to professional
and private individuals, and finance companies’ housing loans
and hire purchase loans for cars and consumer durables.
7. Consumer loans of commercial banks.
8. Personal consumption loans of commercial banks and finance
companies and housing loans of government housing bank,
government savings banks and credit foncier companies.
corporate loan portfolios during the Asian financial
crisis, many turned to the household sector as a new
source of loan growth and profits.  In some cases,
governments encouraged financial institutions to lend
to the household sector to boost the role of domestic
consumption as a source of growth and to reduce
reliance on external demand.  In addition, economic
recovery in the region generated higher income and
improved consumer confidence.  Together with the
low interest rate environment that reduced the cost
of borrowing, younger households with prospects of
higher income have become more willing to borrow in
order to smooth their consumption.
In most economies, the dominant household credit
has been mortgage lending against residential
properties (Table 4).  Commercial lenders have been
eager to enter the residential mortgage market
because such loans are typically viewed as low risk.
TABLE 4
Components of household credits
(end of June 2004)
% Mortgage Credit card Others
Hong Kong 83.0 6.4 10.6
China* 80.1n.a. 1 9.9
Thailand 65.9 7.3 26.8
Singapore 61.9 2.7 35.4
Taiwan 59.8 8.5 31.7
Malaysia 56.5 5.8 37.7
Korea# 55.19.5 35.4
Philippines^ 38.4 45.5 16.1
* Figure for China as of end 2001.
# Commercial and specialised banks only.
^ Only includes mortgages, credit card receivables and auto
loans of commercial banks.
Source:CEIC, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Thailand &
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Although quantitatively less significant, non-secured
credit card debt has been growing faster than
mortgages (Table 6).  The growth of credit card debt
reflects a number of factors.  First, there appears to
be a cultural shift, particularly among Asian youth, in
favour of borrowing for consumption.  The low
interest rate environment also facilitated such a
cultural shift.  Secondly, credit card borrowing to
some extent replaced previous borrowing from the
“curb market” and “loan sharks”.  Government
incentives, such as tax deductions, also encouraged
the use of credit cards, as was the case in Korea.
Credit card debt has helped to improve the
profitability of banks in the region, but it also
represents a new source of risk.  There are a number
of channels through which the risks of credit card
lending can affect financial and macroeconomic
stability.  First, since both lenders and borrowers
have little experience in these new products, it is
difficult for lenders to price the risks correctly.  There
is also likely to be high volatility in borrower behaviour
patterns, particularly when the external economic
environment changes.  Thus credit risks associated
with credit cards are likely to be high, at least in the
beginning.
Secondly, although credit card loans represent a
small part of the lending portfolio of major financial
institutions in Asia, their potential influence on system
fragility can be much larger than commonly assumed,
in part because the distribution of the credit card
portfolio can be concentrated in a number of lenders
(for example, specialised non-bank financial
institutions).  The failure of these lenders can disrupt
financial markets, as they are typically funded in the
wholesale markets, such as bond and inter-bank
markets.  Thirdly, the consequences of consumer
delinquency on private consumption growth can be
larger and more protracted than expected, as many
defaulters are young and jobless and have to rely on
their parents for debt workout.  In other words, the
family tradition in Asia may exacerbate the negative
shock to household sentiment.
This activity has helped finance booming
construction industries and rising housing markets
(Table 5).
TABLE 5
Growth of mortgage loans
(year on year)
H1
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China 218.6 148.7 65.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong 3.2 2.9 3.3 -0.8 -4.0 -1.9
Korea n.a. n.a. 59.4 52.7 15.7 15.5
Malaysia 8.1 17.9 17.3 16.5 16.1 15.4
Philippines 20.7 -23.2 12.3 2.6 0.0 4.1*
Singapore 8.5 6.9 5.5 6.1 14.9 15.9
Taiwan 4.6 4.5 -1.0 5.3 10.1 15.5
Thailand -7.4 -4.0 0.0 11.8 14.3 15.6
* March 2004 figure.
Source:CEIC, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Thailand &
authors’ estimates.
TABLE 6
Growth of credit card receivables
(year on year)
H1
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Hong Kong 7.2 30.11 2.8 -6.3 -3.7 0.7
Korea n.a. 78.5 122.9 39.3 -31.6 -36.1
Malaysia n.a. 36.9 19.7 20.2 15.5 14.0
Philippines 12.5 15.6 16.8 41.4 16.2 16.1*
Singapore 23.2 25.8 21.8 15.5 2.8 -0.3
Taiwan 22.3 34.6 26.4 21.7 26.4 31.1
Thailand -25.2 -3.4 26.3 76.7 30.129.7
* March 2004 figure.
Source:CEIC, Bank Negara Malaysia & authors’ estimates.FEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY QUARTERLY BULLETIN MARCH 2005 16
TABLE 7
Distressed credit cards debt
(in percentage of total receivables)
H1
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Hong Kong 4.8 3.9 8.6 13.5 8.2 5.4
Korea n.a. 7.5 7.3 11.8 34.0 n.a.
Malaysia 5.2 5.14.6 4.14.7 4.2
Philippines 22.6 22.0 21.6 18.7 19.4* n.a.
Singapore 2.7 2.0 2.6 1.7 3.5 3.2
* September 2003 figure.
Source: CEIC, IMF Korea Selected Issues 2003; authors’ estimates.
Owing to inadequate information on the
creditworthiness of households, many financial
institutions in Asia have been poorly prepared to
manage risks associated with consumer lending.  A
number of economies have seen a sharp rise in
non-performing loans in their consumer loan portfolio
(Table 7).  Over-borrowing by some households has
also led to an increase in personal bankruptcies.  An
example is Korea where household delinquencies
reached 3.8 million at the end of 2003, about 17% of
the economically active population, and distressed
credit card debt rose from 7.5% of total credit card
receivables in 2000 to 34% in 2003.  Economic
growth turned negative in the first half of 2003 due to
a credit squeeze in the household sector, and the
government was under pressure to provide relief to
both lenders and borrowers.  Concerned with
systemic risks in the bond market, the government
stepped in to arrange the rescue of the largest credit
card company, LG Card, and set up a
government-backed “bad bank” to reschedule
distressed credit card debt.
In response to the rapid growth of consumer credit,
supervisory authorities in a number of economies
tightened lending standards and raised provisioning
requirements.  Some economies (for example,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) introduced
minimum eligibility criteria on credit card applications.
In Thailand, the Bank of Thailand issued regulations
requiring a minimum monthly income for credit card
applicants in 2002.  The central bank tightened the
rules in March 2004 and capped the outstanding
debt to five times the monthly income of cardholders.
Some authorities also revised the legal and
regulatory framework to ensure better credit
information reporting by, and sharing among, financial
institutions.  Credit reference agencies have been
formed in a number of economies, including Mainland
China, Thailand, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Experience of Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s experience in credit card lending
provides useful lessons for managing risks to
financial stability arising from consumer credit.
Banks in Hong Kong are highly exposed to the
household sector, with household credit1 accounting
for 36.5% of total loans in 2003.  Of this, mortgage
loans and credit card advances accounted for around
83% and 6% of total household debt respectively.
Although credit card advances accounted for a
relatively small share of total loans in Hong Kong,
rising delinquencies led to high levels of charge-offs.
The growth of credit card lending
Following the Asian financial crisis, loan growth
slowed significantly in Hong Kong as the weak
economy curbed corporate loan demand, and the
correction in the property market dampened the
demand for mortgages.  Because of keen
competition, net interest margins of banks also
narrowed.  To maintain profits, banks moved
enthusiastically into the credit card business, leading
to a rapid increase in both the amount of credit card
receivables and the number of credit cards (Table 8).
Between 1998 and 2001, credit card advances
expanded at an average annual rate of 16%.
Outstanding credit card receivables increased by
more than 50% from HK$40.2 billion at the end of
1999 to HK$62.1 billion at the end of 2001.  During
this period the number of credit cards increased by
around 60%.
1 Household credit includes all loans to professional and private
individuals, except those for business purposes.FEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
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TABLE 8
Credit card lending survey of selected authorized institutions*
Outstanding Annualised
 credit card Number of Rollover Delinquency charge-off
receivables credit cards ratio# ratio## ratio###
(HK$ bn) (‘000) (%) (%) (%)
1998 Q4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.16 4.13
1999 Q4 40.2 5,776 54.3 0.76 4.83
2000 Q4 51.2 7,159 54.3 0.92 3.88
2001 Q4 62.1 9,217 53.2 1.28 8.55
2002 Q4 59.2 8,865 54.11 .28 1 3.45
2003 Q4 56.3 8,784 49.3 0.92 8.19
2004 Q3 54.2 9,119 46.0 0.55 4.51
* The survey covered 23 AIs before Q4 2001 and 27 AIs from Q4 2001 onward.
# The rollover ratio is defined as the rollover amount of credit card receivables over total credit card receivables.
## The ratio of credit receivables overdue for more than 90 days to total credit card receivables.
### Charge-off policies vary from institution to institution.  Normally, an account will be written off when the receivable has been overdue
for more than 180 days or when the ultimate repayment of the receivable is unlikely (e.g. the cardholder is bankrupt or cannot be located).
Lending standards began to loosen when banks
started competing for a share of the credit card
market.  As the banks could not check borrowers’
overall indebtedness, some borrowers were able to
obtain several credit cards from different banks and
the credit limits they were granted far exceeded their
repayment capability.  With economic growth
remaining negative for five consecutive quarters in
2001-02, the unemployment rate rose to over 7%.
Credit card receivables also declined between
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September 2002 and March 2004 as a large number
of cardholders could not service their credit card
debt and went into bankruptcy (Chart 1).  The
number of personal bankruptcy petitions increased
sharply from under 1,000 a quarter in 1998 to
around 7,000 a quarter in 2002.  Credit card
charge-offs also rose from 4.1% at the end of 1998
to a peak of 14.6% at the end of September 2002
(Chart 2).  Despite the increase in the charge-off
ratios, the rollover ratio remained stable from 1998 to
2002, demonstrating that around half of theFEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
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outstanding receivables would be paid off monthly
even when the economic conditions deteriorated.
Supervisory response
In response to rising credit card charge-offs, the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority issued the Best
Practices for Credit Card Operations (the Best
Practices Guide) in 2002.  The Guide sets out the
best practices for credit card operations in different
aspects, including policies and procedures,
marketing, approval process, credit risk management
and delinquency management.  On the approval
process, the guidelines state clearly that authorized
institutions must establish prudent underwriting
criteria, which should include
• income level
• employment and length of service
• acceptable credit record
• asset requirement (especially for high risk
customers or customers with no stable income
source)
• acceptable age range
• residence type, and
• permanent residence.
In addition, the Guide requires that credit limits be
set on the basis of the credit profile of individual
customers and their monthly income.  For risk control
purposes, the Guide requires a maximum unsecured
credit limit to be set for each customer, with
sub-limits for each credit card.  In September 2004,
the HKMA issued letters to remind authorized
institutions of the importance of obtaining proper
income proof to accurately estimate the credit risk
level of customers.  The letters warned against
accepting income surrogates in place of proper
income proof as a standard practice.2  The banks
were also asked to set up guidelines for handling
applications from customers who do not have a
stable income source, including how the repayment
ability of these customers should be assessed and
how to set the credit limit.
Credit information sharing
One reason for the high credit card delinquencies
was the inability of banks to accurately assess the
financial position of individual borrowers.  Although
lenders in Hong Kong had been sharing credit data
through a private credit bureau3 since 1985, a
comprehensive database failed to develop, partly
because participation in the credit bureau was not
compulsory and there was a lack of co-operation
among banks.  In 1998, the banks finally reached
consensus on the sharing of consumer credit data.
But at that time, they were restricted by the Code of
Practice on Consumer Credit Data to share only
negative information, such as defaults.  Positive data,
including the level of debt and repayment records,
could not be shared.
The sharp increase in credit card delinquencies in
2001 highlighted the need for positive credit data
sharing.  In March 2002, relevant industry
organisations, including the Hong Kong Association
of Banks, the Deposit Taking Companies
Association, the Licensed Money Lenders
Association and the Finance Houses Association
submitted joint proposals on the issue to the Privacy
Commissioner for Personal Data.  After
2 Income surrogates are acceptable only if they provide reliable
data to enable an authorized institution to accurately estimate
the income level of the applicant.  A lower credit limit may be
granted to cater for additional risk where income surrogates are
used.
3 The credit bureau, Credit Information Services Limited (CIS),
was established in 1982 by 12 finance companies to collect
information on vehicle and equipment financing.  In 1985, the
CIS database was expanded to include default data and the
number of shareholders rose from 12 to 16 with the joining of
credit card issuers and banks.  In 1999, TransUnion
International, one of the biggest credit reference agencies in the
US, acquired a majority stake in CIS.  By the end of 2002, the
size of the CIS database grew to more than two million records,
with contributions from nearly 90 members.  In 2003, CIS was
renamed TransUnion Information Services Limited.FEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
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consultations, the Commissioner revised the Code to
allow lenders to share positive consumer credit
information from June 2003, while putting in place
adequate safeguards to protect the access to, and
use of, such data.
The revised Code allows the sharing of data of all
types of consumer credit, except residential
mortgage loans.  Because of the industry’s concerns
over a possible credit crunch caused by positive data
sharing, access to positive data in the first two years
(June 2003 to May 2005) is only permitted for
assessing new credit applications from customers,
facilitating the restructuring of an existing loan,
reviewing existing credit facilities to put in place a
scheme of arrangement at the request of customers,
or setting up a loan restructuring arrangement where
there is a default in excess of 60 days.  Access will
not be allowed for ordinary credit review or renewal
during the transition period.
To ensure that authorized institutions comply with the
new Code, the HKMA issued statutory guidelines in
May 2003 on the minimum standards that authorized
institutions should observe in the sharing and use of
consumer credit data.  The guideline requires
• authorized institutions to have clear and
comprehensive policies and procedures designed
to
i. ensure the security, confidentiality and integrity
of consumer credit data; and
ii. guard against unauthorised access to or use
of such information that could result in a
breach of the Code and the data protection
principles and relevant provisions under the
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance;
• all authorized institutions involved in the provision
of consumer credit to participate as fully as
possible in the sharing and use of consumer
credit data through a credit reference agency
within the framework laid down by the Code.
Debt workout scheme
The same guideline also deals with the issue of
personal workout.  It provides that at times when
credit information reveals that a customer has an
unmanageable level of indebtedness and might have
genuine difficulty in repayment, authorized institutions
should follow the guidelines set out in the Hong
Kong Approach to Consumer Debt Difficulties
issued by the Hong Kong Association of Banks and
endorsed by the HKMA.  The Approach consists of
formal, but non-statutory guidelines, on how
members of the Association are expected to deal
with personal customers who have genuine difficulty
in repaying consumer loans.  The principles include
the following points.
i. Financial institutions (FIs) should abide by the
guideline and the spirit of the Code of Practice on
Consumer Credit Data issued by the Privacy
Commissioner under the Personal Data (Privacy)
Ordinance.
ii. When the FIs are aware of any financial problems
of customers, the FIs should discuss the matter
with the customer to find a solution that is
mutually beneficial to both the customer and the
FI.  Possible solutions may range from extending
the repayment schedule to rescheduling the
debts, or to offering partial relief (Debt Relief
Plans).
iii. FIs should work out a mutually acceptable
solution with the customer as far as possible,
instead of hastily demanding immediate
repayment of loans, reducing credit lines or
recommending transfer of the balance.  The
industry will best serve the interests of Hong
Kong by adopting a common approach to
consumer debt problems.FEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
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iv. FIs should endeavour to follow (but not limit their
endeavours to) the framework and procedures
that are laid down in the Agreement on Debt
Relief Plans (DRP Agreement).4  Under the DRP
framework, when negotiating a restructuring plan
for unsecured consumer debts of not less than
HK$100,000, a creditors’ committee will be
convened to decide whether there is a viable
case and, if so, a Lead Creditor will be appointed.
When the Lead Creditor starts the negotiation,
there is a standstill period of 30 days and all
creditors are expected to act in a co-operative
and timely manner to agree expeditiously on a
DRP.  The debt restructuring agreement needs a
75% majority.
Following the introduction of positive credit data
sharing and the more recent economic recovery,
credit card charge-offs have begun falling.  At the
end of September 2004, the figure stood at 4.5%,
compared with the peak of 14.6% at the end of
September 2002.  The economic recovery may have
helped lower credit card defaults, but the benefits of
positive data sharing are increasingly being realised.
A number of banks have launched tiered interest rate
products based on the creditworthiness of individual
borrowers.  This will benefit borrowers with good
credit standing.  Positive data sharing has also
strengthened banks’ credit risk management systems
and enabled them to offer better terms to customers.
Lessons learnt
Hong Kong’s experience in credit card lending over
the past few years has shown that policy makers
need to be confident that credit risks are properly
managed and the household sector has sustainable
debt burdens to prevent financial and
macroeconomic instability associated with consumer
lending.  In addition, public policy needs to make
certain that essential financial sector infrastructure for
consumer lending is properly set up.  Accordingly,
the authorities need to
• ensure that banks have proper risk management
systems for consumer credit and establish
guidelines on prudent lending criteria and credit
approval processes;
• facilitate data collection (for example, data on
household debt level and debt service burdens)
by allowing financial institutions to share both
positive and negative credit data of customers
through credit reference agencies, while providing
adequate protection for the privacy of customers;
• educate consumers (particularly the youth) and
raise public awareness about the dangers of
over-borrowing; and
• strengthen the statutory or non-statutory
frameworks for personal debt workout.
4 In June 2002, the HKAB, DTC Association, Finance Houses
Association and HKSAR Licensed Money Lenders Association
endorsed the DRP Agreement.  The FIs active in consumer
finance signed the Agreement to signify their willingness to offer
DRPs to qualified customers.FEATURE ARTICLE THE GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN ASIA
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